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JEROME FRANK'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
JULIUS PAUL*

The constant development of unprecedented problems requires a legal
system capable of fluidity and pliancy. Our society would be strait-

jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers,
constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of ever-

changing social, industrial, and political conditions; although changes
cannot be made lightly, yet law must be more or less impermanent, experimental and therefore not nicely calculable. Much of the uncertainty
of law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value.
-JEROME FRANK'
Justice Holmes' famous statement that "the life of the law has
2
has had a profound effect
on contemporary American jurisprudence. Holmes' monumental influence, together with the impact of positivism, American pragmatism,
and more recently, psychoanalysis, have all played important roles in
shaping the development of the school of American legal realism.
One of the most controversial and provocative members of this
school was Jerome Frank, who was not only a prolific writer on matters legal, but also an eminent corporation lawyer, a government counsel, an administrator (a Commissioner and later Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission), a law teacher, and a highly respected Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit from May, 1941, until his death in January, 1957.
Jerome Frank's fundamental idea is concerned with what he calls
the "basic legal myth of rule certainty." Frank believes that the
worship of legal rules is a carry-over into adult life of father-worship.
According to his argument, the law becomes a father-substitute, with
a corresponding preservation of childish thought-patterns. Although
Frank will admit the necessity and the value of some legal rules, the
exaggerated belief that these rules can guarantee legal certainty is
for him the worst "sin" of modern jurisprudence. In the development
of this idea, Frank is perhaps the first major writer -injurisprudence
to draw consciously on a concept of psychoanalysis.
For the psychological basis of his legal theory, Frank leans heavily
on the work of Jean Piaget, Bernard Hart, and other psychologists.
Frank denounces those whom he regards as believers in legal rule
certainty, especially Joseph Beale, Roscoe Pound, John Dickinson,
* A.B. University of Minnesota, 1947; Ph.D. Ohio State University, 1954.
Assistant Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University.
1. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6-7 (1930).
2. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

not been logic: it has been experience '
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and the late Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, for their failure to notice
the contingent nature of all legal activity. Since the legal order is
always in the process of bending to the new and changing needs of
the social order, legal certainty is only a relative matter, and should
not be regarded as an end in itself.
Legal rules are but part of what is commonly called "law." As a
devoted follower of the late Justice Holmes, Jerome Frank believes
that the data for legal study should be what courts do in fact, not
what they say they do, or what he would call the "rationalizations"
of their actions.
Jerome Frank's critics have consistently accused him of believing
in chaos because of his attack on legal rules, but he has staunchly
denied these accusations with the argument that criticism of the
wishful thinking and childish thought-patterns of the rule-worshippers
does not imply a belief in .chaos, but on the contrary, is the way to
achieve what he calls the "modern mind," the adult and emotionally
mature mind, which he feels is best represented by the late Justice
Holmes ("our most adult jurist") and Judge Learned Hand ("our
wisest judge").
Frank believes that a judge's decisions are but a part of his total
behavior, and that the process of making decisions is in reality a
qestalt or composite of the psychological, environmental, and socioeconomic factors that go into the development of the personality of the
individual judge. Here again he draws heavily on psychology. What
appears to be a rational decision on the part of the judge is, according to Frank, really a judicial "hunch" based upon the judge's reactions
to the "facts" that are brought out in the trial. The judge is a "witness of the witnesses," and as such, he is subject to the frailties of
the human mind in attempting to reconstruct the objective "facts" of a
situation that took place in the past.
In his view, the trouble with most of the studies of judicial decisions is that they concentrate on upper court opinions (and hence,
the legal rules) and not the decisions of the trial courts, where the
vital fact-finding process takes place. This is what Frank calls the
"upper-court myth," a prevalent legal myth that beclouds the importance of trial court activity, which Frank thinks is the heart of our
legal system and of what he calls "court-house government."
For Jerome Frank, the most important part of the judicial process
is fact-finding, and the impossibility of judges, juries, and laymen
alike ever being able to reconstruct a perfectly objective picture of
a legal situation that is ex post facto in nature. The subjective nature
of the fact-finding process will always be one of the weak links in
the judicial process. Frank does not have a solution for this inherent
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weakness in trial court procedure, but he does believe that more
self-awareness and self-limitation on the part of judges (the acknowledgment that judges are also human beings with fallible minds) would
reduce the subjective elements in the judicial process of finding what
the facts are in a particular case. Since it would be impossible to
eliminate all of the subjective factors in the picture, the judicial
process will always remain less than perfect. One of Jerome Frank's
suggested reforms in this regard is the more general use of special
findings of fact by judges at the trial court level.
Frank regards the jury system as outmoded in function and grossly
inefficient as an instrument for finding the facts of a case. As in
the case of judges, Frank believes that the jury is a poor fact-finder
because of its inherent human limitations as "witnesses of the witnesses." Although the judge has special legal training, the jury is for
the most part incapable of recognizing perjured evidence, poor memories, and the like. In this area, Frank speaks rather as an administrator
or practitioner, appealing to the common sense of experience, not to
concepts of psychology.
Jerome Frank suggests a complete overhauling of the jury system,
including special courses of study for prospective jurors. But it is
his belief that the jury should be dispensed with in most trials. The
jury system has outlived its original purpose of protecting the individual against arbitrary authority, and has itself become an arbitrary
instrument of ignorant men who are not only miserable fact-finders,
but also usurpers of the rule-making function of the judge.
Like any reformer who goes beyond mechanical remedies for the
ills he sees, Frank traces the roots. of the difficulties he attacks to the
educational system in which lawyers are trained. He is severely
critical of contemporary American legal education for having followed
the principles of Christopher Columbus Langdell, late Dean of the
Harvard Law School. According to Frank's assessment, law schools
would better perform the function of training intelligent and sociallyconscious lawyers if they became lawyer-schools and not law teacherschools. He suggests that the majority of the law faculty should consist of men who have had actual legal experience outside of the law
library, and he feels that all law students should have "clinical" experience or apprenticeship training in connection with the legal aid
clinics that now exist in many American law schools.
The case method of teaching law has some utility, but Frank believes
that it concentrates too heavily on upper court opinions and legal
rules. Once American law schools can shake off the influence of Langdell, Frank believes that legal education will be more practically
suited to the clinical training of future lawyers and judges.
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Elements of Frank'sPhilosophy of Law
The major elements of Jerome Frank's philosophy of law have been
contained in four of his six books. Law and the Modern Mind, originally published in 1930, was the pace-setter. In his quest for the debunking of the major legal myths, Frank attempted to show the uncertainty and vagueness of the legal rules. If Men Were Angels, published in 1942, attempted to show the uncertainty and vagueness (the
contingent nature) of the facts, at the administrative level as well
as at the judicial level of court-house government. Fate and Freedom,
which followed in 1945, was mainly devoted to a discussion of historical
and scientific methods of inquiry and disavowed most of the isms that
Frank had been accused of believing in.
Courts on Trial was published in 1949. This book was a compendium
of most of his previous writing on the legal myths, the function of the
judge, the jury system and legal education, and added very little new
material to his previous publications.
Frank's last book, Not Guilty, written with the collaboration of
his daughter, Barbara Frank, was published posthumously in 1957. In
its intense condemnation of the conviction of innocent men, it is perhaps the best example of Judge Frank's life-long passion for criminal
justice and the most explicit evidence of his belief in the values of a
democratic society.
The controversial Save America First,which was published in 1938,
was devoted to problems of economic welfare and foreign trade.
In the nineteen years between the publication of Law and the
Modern Mind and Courts on Trial, Jerome Frank vigorously went
forth into the wilderness of law on his crusade against the legal myth
of rule certainty and finality, and despite the heat of the criticism
on all sides of his arguments, he still emerged a man of good humor
and sweet disposition. 3 But American jurisprudence is not, however,
always prone to accept good humor as good law, nor is it always conducive to the sweet disposition. The criticism of the legal journals
is at times vitriolic and bitter, sometimes mellowed and constructive,4
3. A colleague on the bench, Judge Charles E. Clark, confirmed this in a
memorial to Frank, where he said: "Judge Frank, although a gladiator of

unusual power and adroitness, never seemed to harbor permanent spite of
any form whatsoever. Indeed, I doubt if he realized how heavy was the impact of his intellectual blows. He was of a vast kindliness and good humor;
so after a morning of almost mortal combat he would appear at lunch with
new and lively tales of men and events or reports on the latest philosophical
books which he read so voraciously." Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66 YALE L.J.
817, 818 (1957).

4. The following are examples of reviewers who commended the work of
Frank: "Judge Frank's book is worth reading by mature persons who can
distinguish the grain from the chaff and correct its lack of balance. It should
not be recommended to the young and the immature, who may be tempted to
swallow its lopsided theories as uncritically as the author himself has swallowed them." Robson, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 21 POL. Q.
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and at other times, bent on partial or complete demolition of the op5
ponent's arguments.
But Jerome Frank, crusader that he was, was a reformer to the last.
He has never flinched from a good fight, and even when he was the
center of controversy, he attempted to revise or alter his original ideas
so that he would not become a victim of the dogmatism that he so
severely disparaged. For the most part, this writer believes that
Frank's revisions of his own work have not materially changed the
core of his philosophy of law.
Yet, the world of American jurisprudence is a strange one, if we
probe deeply into its environs. Its opinions run the gamut, in the case
of Jerome Frank's philosophy, from Fred Rodell to the late Owen J.
Roberts. Professor Rodell, for example, is an admirer of Frank, but
not a slavish follower of all his ideas. Rodell, being a legal realist
and something of an intellectual "radical" himself, has high praise for
the "eclectic" element in Frank's writing, 6 the breadth of which
amazes even his most ardent critics.
411, 418 (1950). "I commend the book ... for the author's willingness to discuss his own shortcomings; for his shorthand attempt to place himself and
other writers in the jurisprudential 'schools'; for a psychological approach to
judicial action, which though it may be too closely tied to behaviorism, prop-

erly emphasizes the 'gestalt' in law; and for his rather canny observations on
precedent, legislative interpretation, old axioms." Freeman, Book Review,
Courts on Trial, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 943, 943-44 (1950). "In our opinion, 'Law
and the Modern Mind' constitutes the most effective attack that has been made
on legal fundamentalism . . . ." Black, Book Review, Law and the Modern
Mind, 19 Ky. L.J. 349 (1931).
5. Here are some examples of qualified criticism of Frank's writing: "The
book is not well organized, the shots are often carelessly fired and wide of
the mark, many of the shells are duds and some may act like boomerangs.
This friendly criticism of an ally is all the more necessary because these -defects are characteristic of our young liberals who, though they talk much about
science and the methods of science, woefully neglect the art of close reasoning
and seldom trouble to produce logically conclusive evidence for their contentions." M. Cohen, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 133 NATION
259 (1931). "It is perhaps unfortunate that so much of the book is devoted
to the discussion of psychology of the desire for certainty. This is interesting
but unimportant." Bohlen, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 79
U. PA. L. REv. 822. "Law and the Modern Mind is the most provocative
stimulus to thinking on fundamental legal problems that has appeared in the
Anglo-American literature of jurisprudence since Dean Pound's Spirit of the
Common Law.... All this is not to suggest that Law and the Modern Mind
can be swallowed and digested as it comes from the press. It must be washed
and peeled, and there are unripe and over-ripe parts to cut out; it must be
boiled and mashed and seasoned with a good deal of salt before it can safely
be entrusted to a moderately sensitive legal stomach." F. Cohen, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 17 A.B.A.J. 111 (1931).
6. Apropos Frank's eclectic perspective and style of writing, the historian
Richard Hofstadter had this to say in a review of Fate and Freedom: "The
product of a learned, cultivated and muscular intellect, it is a first-rate philosophical book for the layman, and will interest anyone who has ever
pondered the problem of destiny versus freedom." New York Times, Book
Review, July 8, 1945, p. 5. Another reviewer wrote: "This little volume has
a notable structural unity. Its perspective of the past is a tribute to the
resourcefulness of its author. Its vision is a tribute to his genius." Laube, Book
Review, Fate and Freedom, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 307, 309 (1946).
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For Judge Frank, in the breadth and scope of his curiosity and knowledge,
comes about as close as anyone I know to being the modern counterpart
of the fabulous "compleat man" of medieval and earlier times. His book
abounds with eclectic references to anthropology, psychology, philosophy,
literature, mathematics, physics, even music, and with casual quotations
from pundits, past and present, in these and other fields of learning. So
familiar is the Judge with all this stuff, and with his more legal material
as well, that he frequently forgets to footnote for sources the quotes and
paraphrases he tosses off in such profusion.7
To the more conservative legal mind, over half of Frank's work
that is commonly labelled "legal philosophy" is really nonlegal in
nature. The materials that Professor Rodell mentions with respect
are not ordinarily considered the rightful domain of the legal philosopher. Owen J. Roberts, who was formerly Dean of the Law School
of the University of Pennsylvania, and prior to that, Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, did not think that Courts on
Trial presented anything that was fundamentally new in Frank's
writing.8 He suggests that the lay reader concentrate on Frank's
list of legal axioms and suggested reforms in Courts on Trial.
I think that Roberts is correct in saying that the differences between
Frank's earlier work and the conclusions of Courts on Trial are indeed slight ones. It is noteworthy that much of his previous writing
is incorporated in this last book.9 Most of the fundamental assertions
contained in Law and the Modern Mind remained intact in Courts on
Trial, despite Frank's previous eight years on the federal bench.' 0
Although on many occasions, Jerome Frank has claimed the right
to correct his mistakes, his philosophy has remained fundamentally
what it was in 1930, when the first edition of Law and the Modern Mind
came off the press." I think that a close perusal of the legal axioms
7. Rodell, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 25 IND. L.J. 114, 115 (1949).
Literary technicalities are apparently unimportant to an "eclectic" like Jerome
Frank.
8. Roberts, Book Review, 98 U. PA. L. Rsv. 447 (1950). I agree with Roberts'
suggestion that the lay reader confine himself to pp. 419 ff. of the book for the
kernel of Frank's thought on law and related matters.
9. I found that on the subject of legal education, for example, Frank wrote
five articles, all of them alike in style of presentation and content, containing
pretty much the same material. Most of these articles had initially been
speeches. In another instance, the article, originally a speech, was reprinted
in two journals under two different titles. Edgar H. Wilson, in a book review
of Courts on Trial, takes Frank to task for his multiple use of the same materials
in various articles, sometimes (he claims) as many as four. 1 MERCER L. REV.
333, 335 (1950).
10. "Courts on Trial is in the Frank tradition; and it deserves to be regarded as a high point of that tradition. Would it had been the author's
first book! For then its main theme could receive that quiet attention which
it deserves unobfuscated by boisterous controversies still echoing from Law
and the Modern Mind. This new contribution to contemporary juristic thought
deserves to be freed once and for all from past encumbrances." Stone, Book
Review, Courts on Trial, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1950).
11. This would not hold true of one of the most important of Frank's ideas
in Law and the Modern Mind, the psychological notion of law as a father-
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and suggested reforms that Roberts referred to above will prove that
the Jerome Frank of 1949 was pretty much the same as the Jerome
Frank of 1930:
Here is a list of some of the old "axioms" I have thus discussed:
1. The "personal element" in the judicial process should not and
usually does not have much effect on either legal rights or court decisions.
Even if we admit that the "personalities" of witnesses, lawyers, jurors and
judges do have considerable effect, we must disregard all elements of
those "personalities" which are not fairly uniform.
2. The legal rules are the dominant factor in decision-making.
3. When those rules are precise, they ordinarily prevent litigation; and,
if litigation does occur, it will be easy to predict the decisions.
4. Trial judges and juries have only the limited discretion conferred
by the legal rules; they have no discretion when those rules are precise.
5. Decisions result from the application of legal rules to the actual
facts involved in law-suits.
6. If the actual facts of two cases are the same, usually the decisions in
those cases will be identical.
7. Trial courts usually discover the actual facts of cases; usually "the
truth will out"; innocent men are hardly ever convicted; seldom does a
man lose his property or his means of livelihood because of a court's
mistaken notion of the facts.
8. The intense fighting method of conducting trials is the best aid in
discovering those facts.
9. Effective criticism of most decisions is easy.
10. Upper courts can, and do, correct most of the mistakes of trial courts.
11. Upper courts are far more important than trial courts.
12. Less attention need be paid to the selection of trial judges than to
that of upper-court judges.
13. Almost any man licensed to practice as a lawyer is qualified to be
a trial judge.
14. Juries are better fact-finders than judges.
15. Juries are better at rule-making and rule-revising than judges.
16. It is desirable that juries should ignore any legal rules they deem
undesirable.
17. In law-suits (whether or not tried by juries), legal rules relating
substitute. Time and time again, Frank has qualified his somewhat excessive
devotion to this idea, and Courts on Trial is certainly evidence of an awareness of the exaggerated claims of his earlier writings. In the preface to the
sixth printing of Law and the Modern Mind, pp. xiv-xv, Frank made it
clear that he had not made the differentiation between trial-court doings
and those of upper or appellate courts plain enough in the first edition
of 1930. He also pointed out in this 1949 preface that the failure of such
writers as Pound, Morris Cohen, Dickinson, Cardozo, and Llewellyn to realize
the distinctive operations of trial courts was the crucial difference between
those thinkers and himself. Edmond Cahn feels that Courts on Trial differed
markedly from Law and the Modern Mind, particularly in the area of Frank's
worship of Justice Holmes' "prediction theory" of law: "By 1949 when Courts
on Trial was published, it began to be apparent that facts skepticism either

cancelled the value of Holmes' theory or at least required a drastic reformula-

tion." Cahn, Jerome Frank's Fact-Skepticismand Our Future, 66 YALE L.J. 824,
825 (1957). According to Caln, Frank acknowledged this reformulation in
his article, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of
Legal Pragmatism,9 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 447-49 (1954).
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to property and commercial transactions are precise and usually lead to
predictable decisions.
18. Individualization of cases, if desirable, should be accomplished
surreptitiously, not openly.
19. The method of following precedents, if properly used, ensures certainty and stability, supplies rules on which men can safely rely.
20. Trial courts, in fact finding, have little to do with the interpretation
of statutes.
21. Non-lawyers should be deceived into believing that the results of
the judicial process are more certain, regular, uniform and just than in
truth they are or can be.
22. Law students should not be persuaded to observe at first-hand what
goes on in trial courts and law offices.
23. The attempt to obtain legal certainty (i.e., predictability of decisions)
is more important than the attempt to obtain just decisions of specific law
suits.12
Frank says that these legal "axioms" (which are not his assumptions) are not a true reflection of legal reality. One of the major defects of legal axioms (or assumptions) is that the distinction between
what Frank calls "wish-assumptions" (the ought) and "is assumptions"
(the is) is not clearly distinguishable in most legal writing. Since
these "wish-assumptions" are really programmatic in the sense that
they represent the kind of legal order that ought to exist in the future,
they can only be useful if one realizes what the actual legal order is
3
like.1
Clear thinking demands a recognition of legal actuality. Once the
"is-ness" of the legal order can be established, some suggested reforms
can then be intelligently presented to the lay public. 14 This is what
Frank attempts to do when he suggests that the legal axioms that he
12. COURTS ON TRIAL. 419-20 (1949). Reverse all of these axioms and you
will get Jerome Frank's legal philosophy. Frank thinks that points 17 and
18 are the "blind spots" in Roscoe Pound, whom he severely criticized in a
long appendix to IF MEN WERE ANGELS 332-49 (1942).
13. "Interests, points of view, preferences, are the essence of living. Only
death yields complete dispassionateness, for such dispassionateness signifies
utter indifference. . . . The judge in our society owes a duty to act in accordance with those basic predilections inhering in our legal system (although, of
course, he has the right, at times, to urge that some of them be modified or
abandoned). The standard of dispassionateness obviously does not require the
judge to rid himself of the unconscious influence of such social attitudes."
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 413 (1949). See also Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and
Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568 (1932); LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 168 (1930); IF MEN WERE ANGELS 119 (1942); FATE AND FREEDOM;
A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMERICANS 39, 141, 216-17 (1945); COURTS ON TRIAL
353-56, 365-73, 414-15 (1949); and his dissenting opinion in Hentschel v Baby
Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 112 n.20 (2d Cir. 1954). For Frank, the difficult
question is which of the interests or values is to be preferred over the other
possibilities in any particular case.
14. Cf. "Jerome Frank has written a penetrating analysis of our legal
system as it actually operates, rather than as it is supposed to operate. ...
"Judge Frank has given us his critical analysis. His enviable fertility gives
promise that his constructive contribution will be forthcoming as well."
Bendix, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 782, 784 (1950).
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listed were the opposite of legal reality. They served only as the
prolegomena to his subsequent list of proposed reforms:
I have done my best to keep separate my own two kinds of assumptions.
Endeavoring honestly to describe the actualities of courthouse activities,
I have criticized some of them, and have proposed some reforms. For
the reader's convenience, I here list some of those suggested reforms:
1. Reduce the excesses of the present fighting method of conducting trials:
(a) Have the government accept more responsibility for seeing that all
practically available, important, evidence is introduced at a trial of a
civil suit.
(b) Have trial judges play a more active part in examining witnesses.
(c) Require court-room examination of witnesses to be more humane
and intelligent.
(d) Use non-partisan "testimonial experts," called by the judge, to
testify concerning the detectible fallibilities of witnesses; circumspectly
employ "lie-detectors."
(e) Discard most of the exclusionary evidence rules.
(f) Provide liberal pre-trial "discovery" for defendants in criminal
cases.
2. Reform legal education by moving it far closer to court-house and law
office actualities, largely through the use of the apprentice method of
teaching.
3. Provide and require special education for future trial judges, such
education to include intensive psychological self-exploration by each prospective trial judge.
4. Provide and require special education for future prosecutors which,
among other things, will emphasize the obligation of a prosecutor to obtain
and to bring out all important evidence, including that which favors the
accused.
5. Provide and require special education for the police so that they
will be unwilling to use the "third degree."
6. Have judges abandon their official robes, conduct trials less formally,
and in general give up "robe-ism."
7. Require trial judges in all cases to publish special findings of fact.
8. Abandon jury trials except in major criminal cases.
9. At any rate, while we have the jury system, overhaul it:
(a) Require fact-verdicts (special verdicts) in all jury trials.
(b) Use informed "special" juries.
(c) Educate men in the schools for jury service.
10. Encourage the openly disclosed individualization of law suits by
trial judges; to that end, revise most of the legal rules so that they
avowedly grant such individualizing power to trial judges, instead of
achieving individualization surreptitiously as we now largely do.
11. Reduce the formality of appeals by permitting the trial judges to
sit with the upper court on an appeal from his decision, but without a
vote.
12. Have talking movies of trials.
13. Teach the non-lawyers to recognize that trial courts have more importance than upper courts. 15
15. CounTs oN TRIAL 422-23 (1949). Number 1 (e) does not include the
major privilege rules, especially those relating to self-incrimination and
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These are only tentative proposals, for Jerome Frank knows that it
will take many legal minds and perhaps many generations before the
judicial process can even begin to fit the needs of a changing legal
order, especially at a juncture in human history when life is changing
so fast in the technological and political realm that man's moral and
spiritual guides have had little time to catch up with the mechanisms
of his own making.16 The atomic age of modern science is still, in
many respects, the eighteenth century of the jural order. But this is
no reason, says Frank, for abdicating the search for truth.
It is true that, as to vast areas of experience, the human race is ignorant
and will always remain largely so. For there are factors in the universe of
which, because of our limited equipment, we shall always, almost surely,
remain in darkness. Ignorance will therefore always play an important
part in human affairs. But because our ignorance is and must be large,
that is no reason why we should wallow in it, no reason why we should
diminish our efforts to reduce the unknowable so far as possible.17

If ignorance is not bliss and since man is the creature of imperfect
knowledge, the most that we can expect to find are probabilities,and
not nirvana or some kind of perfect certainty.
The insane asylum, and not any part of the ordinary walks of life, is
the place for those who demand complete freedom from all uncertainties.
We are but mortal, and contingency is the essence of mortality. Only in
the grave do we escape it.18
evidence obtained by unlawful searches and seizures, which of course Frank
wants to preserve intact. Numbers 1 (a) and 1 (b) are reminiscent of the
continental European tradition of trial procedure.
16. Cf. "Shorn of the excesses of nominalism and psychiatric lore, Judge
Frank's Law and the Modem Mind did a great deal to awaken students of
the law from a state of ivory-towered stupor; it illuminated many unexplored
realities behind legal processes. Shorn of the excesses of 'subjectivism,' his
Courts on Trial does a first-rate job of spotlighting a neglected area surrounding one of our most important institutions of law-the trial court."

Cohen, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 17 U. Ciu. L. REv. 557, 559-60 (1950).

See McCarter, The Jury System: A Twentieth Century View, 4 KAN. L. REV.
425 (1956); Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 374
(1957).
17. COUaTS ON TRIAL 425 (1949). "Philosophic inquiry at its outset is an
agitating experience, charged with vertigo and sudden discomforts. Whoever engages in it in the skeptical manner that intellectual honesty compels
will appear to be snatching away his neighbors' familiar supports. Hence
for some twenty years (since Law and the Modem Mind) Jerome Frank's writings have met with two classes of readers: one, those whose disturbance led
only to resentment; the other, those whose disturbance prompted them to
reassess old assumptions, to grapple with new challenges, and to feel grateful
for the light he had let into the dark shop. For the latter group and for anyone hardy enough to join them, the publication of Courts on Trial is an important event, because this is his most illuminating work." Cahn, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 59 YALE L.J. 809 (1950).
18. COURTS ON TRIAL 425 (1949). Frank adds: "J. S. Mill said that 'when it
is impossible to obtain good tools, the next best thing is to understand the
defects of those we have.'" Id. at 245 n.15. Cf. "Perhaps the thing most disturbing about the reading of Law and the Modern Mind almost two decades
after its original publication is the fact that it still contains a message of such
pressing urgency. ...
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It is the element of chance, of contingency, and of uncertainty 19
(what Frank earlier called "possibilism") that made life for Jerome
Frank a challenging experience, a pragmatic search for meaning
amidst chaos, paradoxical as that may sound.
To ask for absolute exactitude in any phase of government is absurd.
"Every day, if not every year," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "we have
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge." 20
Cricitism and Counter-Criticismof Jerome Frank's Philosophy of
Law and of Legal Realism in General
As a member of the so-called school of American legal realism,
Jerome Frank has always been under attack for his basic assumptions
on law and the legal order. He has always answered his critics, but
2
he has hotly denied that a "school" of legal realism really existed. '
"One suspects that the thing of continuing value in Law and the Modern
Mind will be less the author's answers to the particular questions propounded
than the forthright manifestation of an attitude of mind and a point of view.
To Judge Frank, self-delusion is the fundamental intellectual sin. Maturity
of thought demands a constant effort to view the subject of inquiry unflinchingly in its full complexity. If thereby universal absolutes are found
to be merely contingent and the security of false certainty is lost, the sacrifice
must willingly be made." Allen, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind,
44 ILL. L. REV. 554, 556 (1949).

19. "The author ought not to make the law more certain than it is. It is
a bit too much like verity for Mr. Frank to insist that law wears the semblance
of certainty because adults demand an infallible authority as a substitute for
a discredited all-wise father ....

It is by no means certain that the intellectual

heritage of law-the conceptual attack, the deductive method of theology,
the fashion of thinking of truth as an articulation of symmetrical propositionsdoes not share the responsibility. In any event, in a zestful adventure like
this, where inquiry thrives upon uncertainty, the issue ought to be left open."
Hamilton, Book Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 65 NEW REPUBLIc 277-78

(1931).

20. COURTS ON TRIAL 426 (1949).

Cf. "The significance of Law and the

Modern Mind is lost if it is tagged simply as a charter for realistic jurisprudence (in fact Judge Frank later repented use of the word 'realistic');
rather, it constitutes a subtle and learned application of pragmatic philosophy,
in advocacy of an experimental, tentative, humanistic, approach to the 'law.'
It is a ringing affirmation of the need for humility in the profession in face of
the elusiveness and transientness of social fact." Hoffman, Book Review, Law
and the Modern Mind, 7 FED. B.J. 223-24 (1946).
21. Much of the criticism that has been levelled at Frank would also apply
to the so-called school of legal realism; the reverse also holds true, but certainly not in every case. Most of my discussion here assumes that most of
the errors of the major American legal realists applied to Frank as well,
since he has always been considered an extremist among legal realists. So
far as the critics (whether they are called non- or anti-realists) are concerned,
the chief ones would be Pound, Dickinson, Fuller, Adler, Morris Cohen, Kennedy, Kantorowicz, Mechem, and Stone. Felix Cohen, who is considered a
functionalist by some writers, is critical of certain aspects of legal realism.
There are variations of outlook on all sides of the picture; hence, my rather
arbitrary categorization should be understood at the outset. See My PnmosoPHY OF LAW; CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AmxaIcAN SCHOLARS (1941), published under

the direction of the Julius Rosenthal Foundation of Northwestern University,
which includes short statements by such men as Bingham, Cook, Morris
Cohen, Dewey, Dickinson, Fuller, Green, Kennedy, Kocourek, Llewellyn,
Moore, Paterson, Pound, Powell, Radin, and Wigmore.
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As early as 1931, Frank protested the use of the term "realism" and
suggested some better term of reference, e.g., "possibilism," "experimental jurisprudence," "constructive skepticism," "legal observationism," or just plain "legal modesty." Whatever the label used, Frank
felt that the so-called legal "realists" were related only in the negative
sense, in their skeptical attitude toward legal rules, and in their
curiosity for observing the law in action. Skepticism and pragmatism
were the main ingredients of their philosophy of law, but variations
of this realistic outlook were numerous.
When writers of realistic inclination are writing in general, they are
bound to stress the need of more accurate description, of Is and not

of Ought. There lies the common ground of their thinking; there lies
the area of new and puzzling development. There lies the point of discrimination which they must drive home. To get perspective on their
stand about ethically normative matters one must pick up the work of
each man in his special field of work. There one will find no lack of interest or effort toward improvement in the law. As to whether change
is called for, on any given point of our law, and if so, how much change,
and in what direction, there is no agreement. Why should there be?
A group philosophy or program, a group credo of social welfare, these
realists have not. They are not a group.2 2
Jerome Frank is not unhappy about the company he keeps; what he
really frets about is the fact that the non- and anti-realists do not
adequately or accurately distinguish the wide variation of viewpoints
among writers of realist persuasion.
The fallacy of the Dickinson-Pound-Fuller-Cohen method of lumping
all the so-called "realists" together can be shown by applying that same

method to critics of the "realists." One would then say that Kennedy,
Pound and Morris Cohen must be assumed to agree with one another
on virtually everything concerning the judicial process because they
both disagree with Llewellyn. On that basis, one would ascribe to Morris
Cohen all the views of Fuller. But everyone who knows the attitudes of

those men knows how absurd that would be. And Kennedy would surely
be shocked if all Cohen's ideas were taken as his.23
22. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1255-56 (1931). See also, id. at 1260-64 for the details
of Llewellyn's point-by-point answer to Roscoe Pound's earlier article, The
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). Frank helped
Llewellyn to write his article, but he did not jointly sign it. It is interesting
to note that in Llewellyn's answer to Pound, he includes such men as Clark,
Corbin, Klaus, Lorenzen, Francis, Sturges, and Tulin within the general framework of legal realism. These two articles by Pound and Llewellyn constitute
a significant part of the realist-functionalist controversy. For the views of

earlier adherents to legal realism, see Bingham, What is Law?, 11 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 109 (1912), and Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234

(N.S. 1914). For a superb article on the history of American legal realism,
see Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence, 26 A.B.A.J.

300, 418 (1940), 40 CoLum. L. REV. 581 (1940).
23. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 278 (1942). Frank devoted a long appendix
V, entitled "Comments on Some Criticism of the So-Called 'Realists,'" (id. at
276-315) to a discussion of the attacks made on him and on other "realists."
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When it comes to distinguishing among his critics, Frank is bound
to be much harder on his "armchair" critics than he is on those who
come from the ranks of judges or practicing lawyers. There are exceptions, of course, but men such as Morris Cohen, Lon L. Fuller, and
Mortimer J. Adler have been good targets for the spirited elements of
Frank's criticism.
Like most armchair students of matters legal, Cohen, for lack of court-

room experience, shuts his eyes to almost everything but legal rules and
principles. And he is able to do so by insisting on discussing nothing but
"law"-defined as legal rules and principles. One wished that some day
Cohen would read and write his reactions to a book like Goldstein's
Trial Technique or Wigmore's Principles of Judicial Proof.24

One of these "exceptions" is the late Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo.
Cardozo, in a paper read before the New York State Bar Association in
1932, set out to demolish most of the arguments of the legal realists.
Frank was unhappy, not so much about the general nature of this attack on legal realism, but about Cardozo's failure to distinguish the two
general types of legal realists, the "fact-skeptics" and the "ruleskeptics."
In Cardozo's article in 1932, on the "realists," he falls into the usual errors:
(1) He mistakenly assumes that all of them, in describing legal uncertainty, are referring exclusively to uncertainty in the legal rules and
principles. (2) He also erroneously asserts that they regard as desirable
the extent of the legal imprecision which they describe as existent. The
second error we may, at this point, ignore. The first is more significant.
For it makes plain Cardozo's lack of great concern with the difficulties of
the fact-finding process and with the grave importance of that process.
It is, indeed, remarkable that in this paper by Cardozo, criticizing the
"realists" (a paper forty-four pages in length) he does not, even once,
so much as mention the discussion of the elusiveness of the "facts" by
those "realists" whom he singles out for special criticism.25

Insofar as a science of law is concerned, in the sense of a body of
knowledge that would suffice to enable the confident prediction of
the outcome of a case, Frank has always denied its possibility, because of the large extent of what he calls "inherent inexactitude,"
both as to the rules and the facts. 26 But Frank's attack on the myth
24. Id. at 283. Of course, Morris Cohen was not a lawyer, and never claimed

to be. He was a logician and a philosopher almost all of his adult life and

always approached the problems of law from that vantage-point. I would

venture to say that in most respects, Cohen had more of the characteristics
of the legal philosopher than Jerome Frank. This I will discuss at the end
of this article.
25. Id. at 288. See Cardozo's paper, Jurisprudence, 55 N.Y.S.B.A. REP. 263
(1932), reprinted in his SELECTED WRITINGS (Hall ed. 1947).
26. On the question of a science of law, Ehrlich wrote: "What men consider
just depends upon the ideas they have concerning the end of human endeavor
in this world of ours, but it is not the function of science to dictate the final
ends of human endeavor on earth. This is the function of the founder of a
religion, of the preacher, of the prophet, of the preacher of ethics, of the
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of rule certainty has at times been interpreted as an attack on all
legal rules. For this reason, he has been labelled a "nominalist" on
many occasions, in contrast to the "conceptualists" who believe in the
existence of legal rules. Felix Cohen, Morris Cohen, Mortimer Adler,
and Lon Fuller would fit into the latter category.
Jerome Frank is extremely critical of Felix Cohen's use of mathematical logic, and what Frank considers to be his complete failure to
see the "gestalt" factors in the judicial process, especially at the level
27
of court-house government.
Professor Fuller believes that American legal realism has done
some good, especially in its exorcism of many of the philosophical and
methodological dogmas of nineteenth century jurisprudence, but it has
also created new confusion. Fuller writes:
The law has always to weigh against the advantages of conforming to
life, the advantages of reshaping and clarifying life, bearing always

in mind that its attempt to reshape life may miscarry, or may cost more
than they achieve. 28
Furthermore, the "conceptualist" and "realist" schools have not always
been clear about what was being discussed.
It is well to remember that the difference between the realist and the
"conceptualist" is not so much a matter of specific beliefs as it is of mental
constitutions. The conceptualist is not naive enough to suppose that his
principles always realize themselves in practice. Indeed, since he is
usually a practical man, he is apt to be more familiar with the specific
ways in which life fails to conform to the rules imposed on it than the
practical jurist, of the judge, of the politician. Science can be concerned only
with those things that are susceptible of scientific demonstration. That a
certain thing is just is no more scientifically demonstrable than is the beauty
of a Gothic cathedral or of a Beethoven symphony to a person who is insensible
to it. All of these are questions of the emotional life. Science can ascertain
the effects of a legal proposition, but it cannot make these effects appear
either desirable or loathsome to man. Justice is a social force, and it is
always a question whether it is potent enough to influence the disinterested
persons whose function it is to create juristic and statute law." FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 202 (Moll transl. 1936). Cf. Loevinger,
Jurimetrics-The Next Step Forward,33 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1949).

27. Frank, 'Short of Sickness and Death': A Study of Moral Responsibility

in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545 (1951). Frank feels that Felix Cohen's
neglect of trial courts seriously limited his ethical insights, and he is especially
M. Borchard's book,
contemptuous of Cohen for his failure to cite Edwin
Convicting the Innocent, in his discussion of legal values. This "omission,"
in my opinion, is not a serious one, and does not materially affect Cohen's
philosophy of law. I might add that this particular article on Felix Cohen,
along with the "armchair" criticism of M. R. Cohen, Dickinson and Adler, and
the remarks about Karl Llewellyn's "failure" to study Tammany Hall "Indians," represent Jerome Frank in a carping, at times picayunish, critical mood.
For the mellower side of Jerome Frank, see Frank, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL
ED. 223 (1952), and his last two articles, Civil Law Influences on the Common
Law-Some Reflections on 'Comparative' and 'Contrastive' Law, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 887 (1956), and Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U.

CI. L. REV. 666 (1957) (published posthumously).

28. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 460 (1934).
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more philosophic realist. It is not, then, that the conceptualist is ignorant
of the discrepancy between Is and Ought. He is simply undisturbed by it.
The realist ends in ambiguity. About one thing he is clear. The dis29
graceful discrepancy between life and rules must be eliminated.
Fuller says that the realist desire for concrete things (e.g., the facts,
or the law in action) has some dangerous pitfalls:
Now this intellectual bias, for it is a bias, has its value in a science which
has suffered for centuries from an unbridled pseudo-rationalism. But
like all biases the realist's peculiar bias may sometimes lead him astray.
He should remember that not all significant facts are "concrete." He
needs to be reminded that the love of the tangible and concrete, like other
3
human loves, may sometimes, when thwarted, fabricate its own object. 0
Felix S. Cohen, whom Frank described as a "rule-skeptic," always
concerned himself with the metaphysical aspects of law, especially in
his book, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals published in 1933. Cohen's
main criticism of legal realism, or what he calls "functional jurisprudence," is that the task of valuation has been ignored:
Functional description of the workings of a legal rule will be indispensable
to one who seeks to pass ethical judgments on law. The functionalist, however, is likely to be lost in an infinite maze of trivialities unless he is
able to concentrate on the important consequences of a legal rule and
ignore the unimportant consequences, a distinction which can be made
3
only in terms of an ethical theory. 1

One valid criticism of Jerome Frank's writing has been the slipshod manner in which he deals with his materials. His books are a
conglomeration of various and diverse materials gleaned from voluminous reading, but sometimes without adequate digestion of their con29. Id. at 461.
30. Id. at 447. Fuller does not specifically mention Jerome Frank in these
criticisms of American legal realism, but it is my view that he meant them
to apply to writers such as Frank. Many other critics of legal realism, and
certainly much of Fuller's discussion, sound remotely like the New Criticism
vs. the Formalist Criticism of modern American literary criticism. I would
even suggest that at times Frank plays the role for American legal philosophy
that the late Gertrude Stein played in modern literature.
31. F. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MODERN L.
REV. 5, 7 (1937). On this point, I think that Roscoe Pound would be in full
agreement with Cohen, namely that many of the legal realists have ignored
the most important element in the judging process, viz., values. In respect to
the problem of language and the law, Cohen wrote: "The object of a realistic
legal criticism will be not the divine vision which follows the words 'Be it
enacted:' but the probable reaction between the words of the legislatureand the professional prejudices and distorting apparatus of the bench, between
the ideas that emerge from this often bloody encounter and the social pressures
that play upon enforcing officials. Words are frail packages for legislative
hopes. The voyage to the realm of law-observance is long and dangerous.
Seldom do meanings arrive at their destination intact. Whether or not we
approve of storms and pirates, let us be aware of them when we appraise the
cargo."

ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS; AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS

OF LEGAL CRITIcISM 240 (1933).
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tents. 32 Elmer Davis, in reviewing Frank's Save America First, found
the book written in a loose fashion that gave the impression of reading "half a dozen different essays printed for convenience in a single
volume." Davis said that during the seven years that Frank wrote this
book, his objective and emphasis had shifted.
The book was written, he says, "in the interstices of an active law practice"; but his interstitial secretions seem to have flowed pretty freely ...

Mr. Frank has such good ideas to sell that it is a pity he did not do a
better job of window-dressing. 33
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who is highly respected by Frank,
was tempted to cry after reading Courts on Trial:
"Jerome, thou art beside thyself; much learning hath made thee mad."
. . . I have never before read a book which contained so much of what

seems to me good plain common sense and so much arrant nonsense. 34

But "arrant nonsense" is a weak expletive, compared to some of the
things Frank has been accused of being: Freudian, economic determinist, psychological determinist, behaviorist, Marxist, isolationist, etc.
Frank has denied his addiction to any ism, philosophical or otherwise.
Yet, Edward F. Barrett, for example, feels that Frank does believe in
an absolute, even if it is a strange one, namely, the "non-absolute." 35
32. Cf. "Intelligent eclecticism deserves no dispraise. But Blackstone's
eclecticism in the field of political and legal philosophy is sadly wanting in
intelligent selection and synthesis. He produced a sort of intellectual bouillabaisse. Holdsworth most inadequately seeks to defend this goulash when he
says that Blacktone 'had read and mastered this philosophic learning; but he
was not mastered by it.' But Blackstone had obviously not 'mastered' this
learning. He slung it together in so inexcusably a careless manner as to
show no real comprehension of it. His discussion of earlier political philosophizing recalls the story of a student who composed a paper on 'Chinese
Philosophy' by reading and combining an encyclopedia article on 'China' with
one on 'Philosophy.' Blackstone's was a shoddy scissors-and-paste job."
Frank, A Sketch of an Influence, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPIEs; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 228 (Sayre ed. 1947).
33. Keep the Home Fires Burning, Sat. Rev. of Lit., June 18, 1938, pp. 5-6.
Most of what Davis said about this book would apply to Frank's other books
as well. Cf. Professor Alburey Castell in a review of F. C. S. Northrop's The
Meeting of East and West: An Enquiry Concerning World Understanding
wrote: "The book contains both a story and an argument. It should be read
first for the story.... But once the book is read for the story, reflection recurs
to the argument." 9 J. HiST. IDEAS 237 (1948).
34. Morgan, Book Review, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 385-86 (1950). Morgan thinks that
a good example of Frank's "nonsense" is his definition of a legal right as "In
short, a legal right is usually a bet, a wager, on the chancy outcome of a future
possible lawsuit." [FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 27 (1949) ]. In discussing the psychological postulates of Frank, especially the notion of the Father-as-Law,
Thurman Arnold wrote: "Is this train of thought scientific? Perhaps not, but
there is that magic in it which may lead to the casting off of dead concepts.
A chisel is a better tool for breaking fetters than a keen-edged razor." Book
Review, Law and the Modern Mind, 7 SAT. REV. LIT. 644 (1931).
35. Barrett, Confession and Avoidance-Reflections on Rereading Judge
Frank's "Law and the Modern Mind," 24 NOTRE DAME LAW 447, 459 (1949).
Barrett thinks that the book needs a complete revision, not a reprinting, and
like Roberts, he feels that Frank hasn't had a new idea since 1930.
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But Frank would not consider this a serious indictment of his work.
In a similar vein, Lee Loevinger writes that Frank's method of
approaching legal problems is somewhat backward.
It seem to me that Judge Frank, implicitly in his criticism of existing institutions and explicitly in his proposed reforms, would have us proceed
from the more specific to the more general and from the more concrete to
the more abstract. .

.

. However, it seems to me that we have arrived at

the point at which we can move forward only by asking specific questions
about the legal process which are capable of relatively scientific investigation. It seems to me that Judge Frank's last book illustrates many of
the pitfalls of the philosophical approach to the legal process. It is filled
with assumptions as to the nature of law-suits, the methods by which
they are handled, and the results achieved, which are obviously too broad
to be supported by the personal observations of one man and yet are asserted without any apparent basis other than the author's opinion. On
the basis of these assertions, it is argued that substantial improvement
would be achieved by giving judges greater power to decide cases according to their own individual ideas of 'justice.' But the argument
rests upon no more than its own mere assertion. How or why the results achieved would be better is not disclosed. 36
Whereas Roscoe Pound calls the legal realists (or at least some of
them) the "give-it-up" philosophers, 7 Professor Philip Mechem calls
legal realism the "jurisprudence of despair." This infuriated one of
Jerome Frank's loyal defenders and former colleague, Thurman W.
Arnold, who answered Mechem with the following statement:
It was a natural reaction which may be compared to the reaction of the
ethical philosophers at the beginning of the century toward psychoanalytical descriptions of "love" and "honesty." They felt their ethical
world crumbling, just as Professor Mechem felt his jurisprudential world
crumbling under the impact of an objective analysis. 38
Much of the criticism of the work of Robinson, Arnold, and Lasswell
was directed not at their use of Freudian terminology and psychological techniques, but at their exaggerated and slavish use of these
techniques. In my opinion, Jerome Frank is not guilty of this extrem36. Loevinger, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 8 ETC.: A REV. OF GEN.

SEMANTICS 34, 42 (1950). Mr. Loevinger is a practicing lawyer in Minneapolis.

See his recent article, Dogmatism and Skepticism in Law, 38 MINN. L. REV. 191

(1954).

37. See POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIc THEORY II, "The Give-It-Up Philos-

ophies," 29-56 (1940).

38. Arnold, The Jurisprudence of Edward S. Robinson, 46 YALE L.J. 1282,

1288 (1937). This article was an answer to Mechem, The Jurisprudence of
Despair, 21 IowA L. REV. 669 (1936), which dealt mainly with the work of
Arnold and Robinson of the Yale Law School, but indirectly included much
of Jerome Frank's philosophy of law. Note Arnold's use of the term "objective
analysis." This did not get by the critical eye of Morris Cohen who attacked
both Arnold and Robinson in a scathing book review of ROBINSON, LAW AND

THE LAWYERS; Cohen, Book Review, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 171 (1936). Thus far, so

far as I can determine, Professor Mechem's jurisprudential world is still pretty
much intact.
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ism, but lies somewhere between Lasswell on the one hand and perhaps Mechem on the other.39 Some critics felt that the Freudian fetish
was a passing fancy of Frank in one state of his growth.
Judge Frank is a pragmatist, as ardent a pragmatist in 1946 as he was a

Freudian in 1930 when he published Law and the Modern Mind.40

While it is true that Frank is a legal pragmatist, he has not always felt that those who followed John Dewey (e.g., Cook, Llewellyn,
Patterson, Cardozo, and Felix Cohen) were truly pragmatic. He says
that their legal pragmatism, if it can be called that, is only twodimensional (they haven't achieved 3-D as yet), and that these socalled legal pragmatists have failed to appreciate the pragmatic bent
41
of Aristotle's legal writings.
Having discovered Aristotle's discussion of equity at such a late
stage of his own writing, 2 Frank was prone to believe that he had
39. Nevertheless, Frank still believed (though less fervently) in the psy-

chological ideas that he presented in Law and the Modern Mind, e.g., fatherauthority, father-substitution, law-as-father, the father-as-judge, etc. It
seems to me that the whole notion of father-authority as used by Frank has
some serious weaknesses. In the twentieth century, when the authoritarian
personality has been under such vigorous attack, in the home, the school, the
church, and in politics, how can such an anachronistic theory hold water? The
nineteenth century father, or clergyman, or even teacher did have an authoritarian position and a role that would have fitted the law-as-father analysis.
But in an era of unprecedented social and political reform, together with the
emancipation of the female, how can Frank still propound a thesis that seems
far afield from the historical facts? (The extreme adulation and worship of
President Eisenhower as a type of father-substitute might bear out Frank's
thesis, and in particular, show the importance of charisma even in a democracy). Perhaps Frank's recent interest in natural law and Thomistic philosophy
was an attempt to recapture the security and father-authority that scholasticism gave to the medieval world. If this is the case, then there are some very
serious contradictions in Frank's philosophy of law. Then again, the confusion
may be all mine. See chap. XXVI, "Natural Law," in FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
346-74 (1949); Kessler, In Memoriam--Jerome N. Frank (1889-1957) in 2
NATURAL LAW FORUM 1 (1957).
40. Gabriel, Book Review, Fate and Freedom, 59 HARv. L. REV.633-34 (1946).
Of course, Professor Gabriel might have meant that Frank was both an ardent
Freudian and a pragmatist in 1946.
41. Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism-JohnDewey & Co. vs.
Aristotle, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 207, 460 (1950). In fact, Frank says that Aristotle was more pragmatic than even John Dewey was, especially in his
Rhetoric. Frank appreciates Aristotle's emphasis on individualization of the
law and his concept of the reality of chance. One might add that Frank's
"discovery" of the late Charles S. Peirce was also late in coming, 1942 to be
exact. Cf., Wormuth, Aristotle on Law, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY; PRESENTED TO GEORGE H. SABINE 45-61 (Konvitz & Murphy ed. 1948).
42. "Somewhere along the line Judge Frank discovered Aristotle. The effect
has been very beneficial." Garlan, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 47 J. PHILOS.
704, 708 (1950). On the subject of Aristotle, Frank had this to say: "Since he
saw unconquerable unruliness, spontaneous chance and change, as part of
reality, his notion of 'natural law' was not likely to be that of an 'absolute
standard,' permanent and unchanging. Anti-Platonist, anti-totalitarian, he
was an exponent of a point of view which, once more, we today are formulating: That all the legal rules men encounter in actual experience are man-made,
but that the ideal of justice is ever at work, demanding that, to meet new
circumstances, those rules be constantly adjusted so that, in particular cases,
they will respond to the community's sense of fairness. The word 'justice,'
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discovered a hitherto unknown gold mine. His virtuous air of originality in seeing for the first time what philosophers had pondered time
out of mind has bothered some reviewers, and this writer is inclined
to believe that the "compleat man" that Professor Rodell wrote about
43
can sometimes behave like the compleat fool of modern vintage.
Jerome Frank has stoutly denied the anti-realists' assertions that
the legal realists do not believe in legal certainty, ideals," or in reason.
Frank has a healthy respect for all of these, but where he differs
strongly from his "non-realist" critics isin description of the extent of legal uncertainty occasioned by the power
of courts to find the "facts in litigation".. .. 45

As a legal philosopher, Jerome Frank has never delighted in legal
uncertainty; his main purpose throughout his basic writings has been
too, someone may reply, is vague and has many meanings. But it carries no
false connotation of being a gift to mankind, something that men can attain
effortlessly." Frank, Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1129 (1944).
43. "He takes pains to avoid the charge of nihilism or antinomianism. He
is more prone to cite Aristotle than Freud. A time there was when Jerome
Frank was the Robinson Jeffers of jurisprudence. It is hardly in order, however, to expect a judge of the United States circuit court of appeals to live on
locusts and wild honey, to carry fire in his bosom and walk upon hot coals."
Konvitz, Book Review, If Men Were Angels, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1020, 1022 (1943).
If Frank was once the Jeffers of jurisprudence, might I add the suggestion
that he is now the John Masefield of the modern school?
44. If this were the case in respect to Frank, how could his life-long fight
against the use of "third degree" methods by police officials be explained?
Or his trenchant criticism of capital punishment, and his zealous regard for
civil rights generally. See JEROME & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUITY (1957);
Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 Fed.
R.D. 93 (1954). See also Frank's opinion in United States ex rel. Caminito v.
Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955). On the admissibility of evidence, see his
concurring opinion in United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 679-80 (2d Cir.
1955), and his vigorous dissent in United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57, 70-75
(2d Cir. 1956). On the problem of self-incrimination see his opinion in United
States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir. 1956), especially his statement
that "An overzealous prosecutor's heaven may be everyone else's hell"; and
his eloquent concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801-27
(2d Cir. 1956), especially the appendix, where he traces the history of American obscenity legislation. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In regard to the use of reason,
there is still some doubt in the minds of many of his critics, e.g., Arthur N.

Holcombe: "We like to believe that -men's conscious and deliberate purposes

have to some extent affected the past, and can also to some extent affect the
shape of the future. But is there such a sharp conflict between Americans'
natural faith in themselves and interpretations of history which recognize the
validity of at least the possibility of scientific laws in the realm of human
behavior? . . . He seems not to try to go beyond the will to believe in his
articles of faith and to search the ultimate foundations of faith itself. Lacking
further interest in philosophy, he might have fortified his faith with poetry."
Holcombe, Book Review, Fate and Freedom, 40 Ami. POL. Sci. REV. 356, 357
(1946). '"W7hen he tells us that history is not a science, he rides this essentially
sound theme so hard that he almost undermines our conviction that we can
make any useful interpretations of history. He has had to make many such
interpretations himself, and he often makes them with undue ease." Hofstadter,
Book Review, Fate and Freedom, New York Times, July 8, 1945, p. 5.
45. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANrELS 305 (1942). Frank regards his deep respect
for Justice Holmes as positive proof of his regard for syllogistic reasoning.
Adler and F. S. Cohen strongly dissent.
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to bring about improvements in the difficult process of finding the
facts (subjective as they are) in lawsuits. One could almost argue
that Frank felt that he had the moral duty to tell the American people
what was wrong (in his opinion) with their legal system.
The legal traditionalists' viewpoint has carried over to many educated
non-lawyers, giving them a false and generally soothing impression of
the operations of our court-house government. In this book, I triedI hope in a manner understandable to intelligent laymen-to dissipate that
false impression, because I felt that, in a democracy, the citizens have
the right to know the truth about all parts of their government, and
because, without public knowledge of the realties of court-house doings,
essential reforms of those doings will not soon arrive.46
Another accusation that Jerome Frank disavows is the assertion
that the legal realists believe in nothing but force.
Since the violation of some laws is a normal part of the behavior of
every member of every group, lawlessness reduces to a charge of a mistaken selection of the existing laws which are to be ignored. It is evident
that the notions of what constitutes such a mistaken selection vary from
group to group and are not uniform even within any particular group....
The seeming lawlessness of any group is the result of the gap between the
legal standards apparently set by the political community and the more
exigent ethical standards and psychological drives operative within that
particular group.47

The legal realists have achieved at least one noteworthy accomplishment in the history of modern American legal thought, namely, the
stimulation of creative discussion about the content and the quality
of our legal institutions. 48 They have evoked criticism from the most
46. Preface to the sixth printing of Law and the Modern Mind xvii (1949).

"To me, it seems that man's legal philosophy-so far as it is his own and not

merely borrowed verbiage-usually is somewhat in step with his general
world-outlook; and that outlook, in turn, usually more or less reflects his
personality. His legal philosophy, then, to the extent that it is original and
articulate, derives from the clash of his personality with the governmental
problems of his times and with the ideas of other legal philosophers with
which he is acquainted. To neglect either the individual or the social context
of any vital legal philosophizing is to depersonalize it-and thus to deform it.
Comprehension of another calls for empathy. .
25 IND. L.J. 231, 235 (1950).

. ...
Frank,

Book Review,

47. Frank, Lawlessness, in 9 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 277, 278 (1935). Social control,
of which law is only one part, would then consist of bringing the legal norms
into closer proximity with the ethical and psychological norms of human
existence. Although Frank has been mainly concerned with specific court
decisions rather than with law as a constructive social force, he has always
believed in the need for reducing civil strife through various means of social
control and mediation. E.g., his article, Frank, Realistic Reflections on Law
as a Constructive Social Force, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
SOCIAL WORK 326-32 (Detroit, Michigan, 1933).
48. The following reviewers evidence the same belief: "Few judges are
articulate, for all the opinions they write. Judge Frank is not only articulate
but concerned, and he dignifies himself in showing how the profession can
dignify itself by improving its means of inquiry. This should never be called
reform: it is a worthy exercise in discovery and maturity, and a contribution
to honest legal thinking." Judge Curtis Bok of Philadelphia in a Book Review
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fertile minds in the field of jurisprudence and this, in itself, is an
achievement that deserves praise.
Because Jerome Frank was a crusader in the most complete sense
of the term, he has evoked more criticism of his work than some of the
other legal realists. He has not failed to attack even the giants in
49
the field if he felt that their logic was in error.
Jerome Frank's conception of his "mission" has been far broader
and all-inclusive than the purposes of men like Karl Llewellyn or Max
Radin, who are much humbler in their efforts to find a pragmatic basis
for legal reform. For example, Llewellyn writes that:
Law's precise office is not to change, but to prevent change; or when
that will not do, then to adjust with the least possible rearrangement to
the new condition.5 0

Karl Llewellyn, like Frank, is not happy about the way some of the
anti-realists have attacked his writings. In 1930, he published privately
a small but important book called The Bramble Bush, in which he
gave a definition of what he thought the "law" really is:
This doing of something about disputes, this
the business of the law. And the people who
whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks
officials of the law. What these officials do
mind, the law itself.51

doing of it reasonably, is
have the doing in charge,
or jailers or lawyers, are
about disputes is, to my

The reaction to this statement by Llewellyn was as vigorous in 1930 as
the criticism that was forthcoming when Frank published Law and the
of Courts on Trial, in 268 ANNALS 219 (Mar., 1950). Marshall H. Fitzpatrick
wrote: "Laymen and members of the profession alike will learn much from
this book. The layman will certainly have a better idea of what trial courts
do and what they should do. Many lawyers will be aided in dispelling the
unsuspected 'mote' of legal wizardry from their eyes. Activists seeking
improvement in our legal system will do well to ponder the tentatively suggested reforms which evolve from the matters discussed in the book." Fitzpatrick, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 2 ALA. L. REV. 181, 184 (1949). Or
Alfred L. Scanlan in a Book Review of Courts on Trial: "We can say that this
book strips away the robe of awe and mystery which some of our chickenhearted legalists like to surround the law, that supposedly dehumanized concept to which we all pay homage. .. ." Scanlan, Book Review, 25 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 396, 399 (1950).
49. "No one with a taste for philosophy can fail to find interest and stimulation in Judge Frank's review of the history of political ideals. Of course, he
attacks everyone who does not fit into his synthesis but this is the beauty of
a crusader who believes in his cause.. . ." Thurman W. Arnold, Book Review,
Fate and Freedom, Sat. Rev. of Lit. June 23, 1954, p. 10. Arnold always did
like a good fighter. Cf. the remarks of E. Blythe Stason: "Also, it is unfortunate
that the author has attacked Dean Pound so vigorously. Doubtless there is a
fundamental disagreement between the two, but there is still room in America
for honest and healthy difference of opinion. Each man has made and is
making an important contribution to American jurisprudence. I believe it
would be more dignified to minimize personalities." Stason, Book Review,
If Men Were Angels, 41 MICH. L. REV. 269, 275 (1942).
50. Symposium on Law and the Modern Mind, 31 COLTM. L. REV. 82, 88
(1931).
51. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951).
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Modern Mind in the same year. Llewellyn was incensed over the reaction to the definition of law that he presented in his book.
No piece of ammunition in the whole teapot compares in the frequency
of its use, nor yet in the irresponsibility thereof, with our little thirteen
word passage. With its help, I was shown to disbelieve in rules, to deny
them and their existence and desirability, to approve and exalt brute force
and arbitrary power and unfettered tyranny, to disbelieve in ideals and
particularly in justice. This was painful to me. But it was even more
painful to observe that none of the attackers, exactly none, gave any
evidence, as they slung around the little sentence, of having looked even
at the rest of Bramble Bush itself. A single sentence, if it made a good
brick-bat for a current fight, was enough to characterize a whole man
and his whole position. And that ought to be painful to anybody .... 52
While Frank regards law as what courts do in fact, Llewellyn
stretches this definition to include all public officials who act in
respect to disputes. Both definitions have created havoc among those
non- and anti-realists who feel that this nihilistic-type definition can
only lead to complete and utter chaos. An example of a critic who
finds these realistic definitions of law almost fantastic in their implications is William Seagle, who wrote:
Thus a hard-boiled school of American "realists" tends to regard the
law as simply "what the court will do in fact." It is one of the few
definitions in which the point of view of the lawyer advising the practical-minded client is taken into consideration. But no lawyer can tell
a client what the courts will do in fact. He can only tell him what the
courts are supposed to do. .

.

. A leading realist defines law as simply

"official action." But if law is thus what legal officials will do, why
not say with equal logic that the law is what laymen will do? There is
much law which is followed by laymen although it has never been litigated
in the courts. The reductio ad absurdum of the whole position is that
a statute is not law until it has been interpreted by the courts. Yet
it is a position from which one of the founders of realism has not shrunk.
Thus the legislator vanishes completely. Moreover, the whole conception
of legal error and a hierarchy of appellate tribunals becomes impossible.
There can be no such thing as an error of law if there is no such thing as
law. The courts may freely disregard law if the law is what they do in
fact .... 53

Edgar Bodenheimer is fearful of what the realists have done to
what he calls "a government of law":
A second objection to realist jurisprudence is that it constitutes a new
form of Austinianism. The realistic theory of law has dethroned the
Austinian legislator and put in his place the American judge as the
sovereign creator of the law. Austin conceived of law as a command of
a sovereign legislator. The legal realists, particularly Frank, conceive
52. Id. at 10.
53. SCUGLE, THE HISTORY oF LAW 17-18 (1946).
the title, The Quest for Law.

Originally published under
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of law as a command or pronouncement of a sovereign judge. Both views
throw little light on the essential character of the law ....54
Jerome Frank would emphatically deny that he made anybody or
anything sovereign in the sense that Bodenheimer uses. He has said
on many occasions that all he was doing was describing how the
judicial system actually worked, not how it ought to work. If it is the
judges who make law, that is a fact, and not a "wish-assumption"; or,
if it is not an objective "fact," it is at least the best statement of legal
reality that a contemporary legal philosopher can offer at this stage
of human knowledge. Yet Bodenheimer, Pound, Morris Cohen, and
many other writers felt that the legal realists' attack on rule certainty
has led to some dangerous consequences.
There is a certain danger that the skepticism of realistic jurisprudence
may, perhaps very much against the intents and wishes of its representatives, prepare the intellectual ground for a tendency toward totalitarianism. If realistic jurisprudence is interested in the preservation of the
law, it must supplement its analysis and criticism of the present legal
order by a constructive program of legal change which leaves undisturbed the essential features of a "government by law."55
But Bodenheimer's admonitions fall on deaf ears, since his proposals would, of course, be impossible from Frank's point of view. If
rule certainty and the law-as-father are the basic legal myths, how
can "constructive" legal change leave these myths intact? The whole
temper of Frank's legal philosophy (or at least his program of reform)
is to expose legal myths to public scrutiny, and then proceed to bring
the legal system into proximity with contemporary social ideals (however defined). And a "government of (or by) law" is not a part of
Frank's program, if this means government by absolute rules of law,
or exaggerated worship of legal rule certainty, or a crass rejection
of the part that judicial fact-finding plays in the judicial process.
Herman Kantorowicz takes a somewhat different view of the legal
realists, based mainly on their methodology and their confusion over
what he considers to be the basic rules of philosophical inquiry. So
far as he can detect, the basic "sins" of the realists are their confusion
of the natural as against the cultural sciences; explanation and justi54. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 314 (1940). Casting a "plague on both your
houses" still leaves Bodenheimer with the problem of finding a better definition
of law.
55. Id. at 316. The realists would be extremely hurt by the above statement,
for they conceive of themselves as thorough-going democrats and not totalitarians. But "executive justice" sounds like and is very much akin to the
"totalitarian liberalism" of a decade ago. For Jerome Frank, this entire discussion would be labelled "verbomania." See Frank's preface to the sixth
printing of FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xxiii (1949); FRANK, IF MEN
WERE ANGELS 3-9, 190-211 (1942); FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 405-06 (1949);

Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism-JohnDewey & Co. vs. Aristotle, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 207, 460, 490-92 (1950); PEKELiS, LAW AND SocIAL
ACTION 87-90 (1950).
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fication; law and ethics; realities and their meaning; a concept and the
elements that comprise that concept; and cases and case law.6
Much of the confusion amidst the realists' and anti-realists' discussion of legal philosophy is caused by the troublesome "is" and "ought"
of the judicial process. The non- and anti-realists say that the legal
realists deny the existence of rules and therefore do not believe in
values. The realists emphatically deny this accusation, but advance
the notion that the "is" and the "ought" must be clearly separated, at
57
least for purposes of analysis.
And this is where the real trouble begins. Pound, for example,
argues that if values are left out of the picture (even for analytical
purposes), then the judicial process is examined in a distorted and
unrealistic light Frank and Llewellyn argue that this is not the case,
but even realists such as Felix Cohen (even if he is called a rightwing "rule-skeptic" by Frank) think that the legal realists must face
up to the fact that such a separation poses many dangers which some
realists have been unable to avoid. Across the troubled waters of
this legal controversy, one is reminded of the Biblical proverb, "as ye
sow, so ... "
Julius Stone is one of the more brilliant of the modern legal writers
who has written extensively on the problem of the "is" and the
"ought" of the jural order. He says:
At the outset it is well to make the distinction, oversight of which, in the
present writer's opinion, may have made much of the Pound-Llewellyn
disputation unreal. A court's view of what ought to be-the social idea,
or the theory of justice, or "policy," with which it approaches a case before it, may undoubtedly in many instances affect the result. Now from
the point of view of the court itself its decision was influenced by a
56. Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240,
1248-50 (1934). This article is still considered to be one of the best short
critiques of American legal realism. One of the most penetrating assessments
of Frank's legal philosophy can be found in McWhinney, Judge Jerome Frank
and Legal Realism: An Appraisal, 3 N.Y.L. FORUM 113 (1957). Also, see
Jerome N. Frank, 1889-1957, which contains the memorials delivered at the
special meeting of the New York County Lawyers' Association and The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, May 23, 1957.
57. It is interesting to note that Frank accuses the economists of an indifference to values: "Scientific method, in the most exact sciences, entails
awareness, so far as may be, of the 'personal equation' so that due allowance
can be made for it. Most economists have not borrowed that wisdom from
the natural scientists. By pretending to themselves and to others that their
alleged science rests on a complete indifference to ethical values and ideals,
many economists have concealed the ever-present activity, in their thinking
and observations, of their own social ideals. Their suppressed ethical attitudes
and assumptions thereby become the more pronounced in their effects. Asserting that they were dispassionate, the economists became particularly passionate ... ." The Scientific Spirit and Economic Dogmatism, in SCIENCE FOR DEMOCRACY; PAPERS FROM THE CONFERENCES ON THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT AND DEMO-

CRATIC FAITH 19 (Nathanson ed. 1946). While the economists bear the brunt
of Frank's attack, his thesis would probably apply to all of the social sciences,
including law.
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conception of what ought to be. From the point of view, however, of a
historian or a research worker, who is seeking to understand the decision, that "ought" becomes an "is"- for him it is not the validity of
the "ought" which is important, but the fact that the court accepted that
"ought" and thereby allowed its decision to be affected. So in this latter
sense, Professor Pound has repeatedly insisted that the "received ideals"
of the common law are a part of our legal materials, just as much as are
particular precepts. In other words, his point is that the ideals of the
actors as to what the law ought to do are a vital part of the observable
8
facts.5
I would agree with Stone that the ideals that men live by and act
upon are as much a part of what Frank regards as the "facts" (legal
reality) as are the actions of courts or judges or juries. This fact
was brought home long ago by Eugen Ehrlich, and later by Max
Weber, Roscoe Pound, and others.59 Fact and value are an inseparable
part of all legal activity. The disregard or the minimization of this
element in the judicial process is, in my opinion, one of the major
weaknesses of Jerome Frank's philosophy of law.
If Professor Llewellyn's call for divorce of the "is" from the "ought"
were read to mean that the observer should ignore that part of the
facts (for instance, of judicial decision) which consists of the ideals which
actually move or are likely to move the actor (that is, the court), what
A. D. Lindsay terms "the operative ideals", it would clearly be unsound.
It is not believed that he intends to go so far. For the most part it is
clear that he is asking not for the observer to ignore the actor's ideals, but
for the observer to put aside his own so that the accuracy of his observation and description shall not be interfered with ....
To summarize, then,
inquiries into the ideals of justice, to which men feel impelled to conform,
"what these ideals are, whence they come, and whither they lead", are part
of the data of sociological jurisprudence above defined .... 60
Can a judge's actions be separated from the values upon which he
bases his decisions? This is a crucial question for modern jurisprudence, and it is this writer's opinion that most legal realists, including Jerome Frank, have not sufficiently studied it. Other writers
61
on legal realism take a somewhat different view.
58. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 382-83 (1946).

59. Cf., "The human animal has always desired something beyond himself.
He has expressed that desire in symbols-'magic'-to complement his rational
equations. Justice, even through human courts and more human juries, is
still one aspect of a search for an eternal value, which outruns attainable reason." Berle, Book Review, Courts on Trial, 86 SURVEY 90 (1950).
60. STONE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 383. See EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 202 (1936).

61. E.g., Francis R. Aumann: "In emphasizing the factor of control the
realists do not deny that 'purpose has always been an inescapable factor in
determining what shall be enforced as law' but stress the point that the
adaptation of means to an end ought to be self-conscious and methodical, a
recognized part of the jurists' problem." Aumann, Some Changing Patterns in
the Legal Order, 24 Ky. L.J. 38, 41 (1935). (Inserted quotation from Sabine,
The PragmaticApproach to Politics,24 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 865, 875 (1930)).
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The methodological problem would be simple indeed if Llewellyn's
naive notion of what the problem entails were accepted:
Meantime, the fusion and confusion of Is and Ought is so unnecessary.
All that the social scientist need do is, in his writing, as in his thinking,
to mark off for the reader's observation and for his own the place where
his science ends and his prudence begins. We all recognize the difference
between a statement of established facts based on a thorough investigation and a statement of the probable or suggested facts based on a fragmentary canvass .... 62

Even if the pragmatic, contingent nature of legal realism is advanced as a defense of their position, this does not adequately answer
the critics who raise metaphysical questions. For troublesome valuejudgments always seem to enter, and not only in the cases where mere
"probabilities" are involved.
Questions of probability, like questions of validity, are to be decided
entirely on objective considerations, not on the basis of whether we feel
an impulse to accept a conclusion or not.63
These "feelings" about the facts nearly always tend to color investigations of factual phenomena, especially when the observer is
both the fact-gatherer and the fact-assessor. And in the field of jurisprudence, where fact and value are so closely intertwined, the problem
of unravelment is exceedingly difficult.
The real issue is not whether factual knowledge is necessary for a
moral judgment but whether it is sufficient without a distinctly ethical
premise. Can we from a number of premises which describe what is,
Reflection shows
deduce a conclusion which prescribes what ought to be?
4

this to be logically impossible and morally confusing.6

Value-free judgments about the legal order would necessitate complete neutrality. But this is not easy to accomplish in law or in any
62. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realist's
Critique, in EssAYs ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 101 (Brookings Insti-

tution, Committee on Training 1931). This is an almost unbelievable oversimplication, and astonishing from a legal realist who is considered "moderate."
If the problem were as simple as Llewellyn paints it, social scientists wouldn't
argue about either their methods or their results. "Prudence," even of the
Llewellynian variety, is a very rare commodity, certainly among many legal
philosophers of realistic persuasion. Cf. the interesting and novel definition

of the scientific method made by the famous physicist, Percy W. Bridgman:
"I am not one of those who hold that there is a scientific method as such. The
scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one's
damnedest with one's mind, no holds barred. What primarily distinguishes
science from other intellectual enterprises in which the right answer has to

be obtained is not the method but the subject matter. . . ." Bridgman, The
Prospect For Intelligence, 34 YALE REV. 444, 450 (1945). (Emphasis added).
63. M. COHEN & NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO Loac AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
157 (1934).
64. Cohen, Book Review, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 171, 176 (1936). Cf. Frank, Mr.
Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568 (1932),

where Frank decries the confusion over the "Is" and the "Ought."
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other social science. Perhaps the legal realists, in their zeal to get

at the roots of legal behavior, at the facts (whether they be subjective
or objective), have failed to see fully the element of flux in the legal
order. In their desire for legal actuality and reality, they have not
always been able to distinguish the variegated elements that comprise
65
the judicial process.
Nor have the legal realists always appreciated the interactive elements within that process. Having lost their sense of historical tradition and continuity, they had only facts to rely on, but facts can never
establish a system of relationships without being ordered by an ob66
server. Facts by themselves are meaningless.

One of the weaknesses of the school of legal realism was not only
their zeal for facts, but also their over-emphasis of facts in themselves,
without a correspondingly acute appreciation of the relations between
fact and value. Morris Cohen thought that this approach was itself
an absolutist one, and he constantly warned the legal realists about
their blind reliance on the one segment of the legal order that they
thought vital, namely, the area of legal action.
The law is not in fact a completed, but a growing and self-correcting

system. It grows not of itself but by the interaction between social
usage and the work of legislatures, courts, and administrative officials
and even legal text writers. In this growth the ideas which people have
of what the law is and how it ought to grow are not without influence,
though obviously inadequate for complete control of all future decisions.
The logical error of absolutism is the same in the revolutionary as in
the conservative camp-the love of undue simplicity. Metaphysically this
shows itself in the assumption of absolute linearity of determination be65. On the question of functional jurisprudence and the problem of legal

certainty, see the following: Lopez de Onate, LA
1950); Norberto Bobbio, La certezza del diritto
NAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO
FOR THE FUNCTIONAL INVARIANTS OF

CERTEZZA DEL DIRITTO

(Rome,

un mito? RiViSTA INTER(Italy, fasc. 1, 1951); MARIo LiNs, SEARCH
LAW (1955). Also, AUMANN, THE INSTRU-

MENTALITIES OF JUSTICE: THEIR FORMS, FUNCTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

(1956).

66. "It is easy for those who have not reflected on actual scientific procedure
to say: Begin with the facts. But an even more fundamental difficulty faces
us. What are the facts? To determine them is the very object of the scientist's
investigations, and if that were but the beginning or first stage of science, the
other stages might be dispensed with. To determine the facts scientifically,
however, is a long and baffling enterprise, not only because the facts are so
often inaccessible, but because what we ordinarily take for fact is so often full

of illusion. Our expectations and prepossessions make us see things which do

not in fact happen, and without the proper previous reflection we fail to
notice many obvious things which do happen. The problem of how to get rid
of illusion and see what truly goes on in nature requires that persistent and
arduous use of reason which we call scientific method." M. COHEN, REASON AND
NATURE; AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 77-78 (1931).
See
FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 294 (1942); FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM c. 14,
"Hard Facts," 174-87 (1945); FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 211-12, 316-17, 320, 324
(1949); Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism-JohnDewey & Co. vs.
Aristotle, 25 NOTRE DAME LAw. 207, 233-34 (1950); Frank, "Short of Sickness

and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 545, 579-81, 586-87, 592-95 (1951).
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tween universals and particulars, principles and actual decisions. But from
universals alone we cannot determine particulars, and the latter obviously
67
cannot completely determine the former.
Perhaps this entire discussion of fact and value in jurisprudence
is out of order, since no definition of the scope of jurisprudence has
been advanced in this paper. Is Jerome Frank a legal philosopher, and
can his work be subsumed under the label, "jurisprudence"? What
exactly do we mean when we use this term?
Though the term "Jurisprudence" may conceivably and with justification
be employed to denote much else, in this study the term is taken to
mean recorded thinking about the source, nature, end and efficacy of law,
substantive and adjective, and of legal institutions.6 8
George W. Paton uses a somewhat different definition of the term
"jurisprudence":
It is absurd to suggest that there is only one useful path for jurisprudence
to tread. . . . In short, jurisprudence is a functional study of the concepts which legal systems develop, and of the social interests which law
protects. This seems to the writer the most useful approach, though the
69
finding of other schools cannot be ignored.
If we accept Reuschlein's definition of jurisprudence, then Jerome
Frank's writing is deficient in one respect, viz., his lack of conscious
concern for the ends of law. Can Frank be classified as a legal philosopher if he leaves out the problem that law has always posed for
men of ideas: the problem of justice? To this accusation, Frank and
the legal realists would plead "not guilty," for in their zeal for improvement of the legal system, they have always concerned themselves
with the problem of justice. Frank explained this in his statement
that:
Actually, these so-called realists have but one common bond, a negative
characteristic already noted: skepticism as to some of the conventional
legal theories, a skepticism stimulated by a zeal to reform, in the interest
of justice, some court-house ways. . .. 70
Even under Paton's definition, Frank's work would apparently be
lacking, since he is not concerned with social interests, but in how
the legal order operates in the protection of these interests.
But here the semantics of jurisprudence becomes confusing and de67. M. Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal Thought, 84 U. P.A. L. REV. 681,
691-92 (1936).
68. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENcE--ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS V (1951).
69. PATON, A TEXT-BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE 31-32 (1st ed. 1946).
70. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN AD viii (1949). Although this does not
represent a definition of justice, it is at least a recognition that justice exists
or ought to exist. For an excellent example of how the unattainability of
complete legal certainty affects the moral dilemmas that face judges, see
Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152,
154-155 (2d Cir. 1947).
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ceptive. "Values," "social interests," "justice,.... ends of law," are not
missing from Frank's legal philosophy if we carefully examine the
foundations of his philosophy. His skepticism and eclecticism were not
evidences of a disbelief in values, but in a distaste for any absolute
system of values or social ends. His pragmatic bent could enable him
to choose the "best" that he could find in any area of life. Certainly,
his life-long concern for the operation of the legal system, particularly
in the area of criminal justice, clearly evidenced his fervent belief in
the value of the democratic system and its ever-widening possibilities
for enhancing human personality and development. "There-in the
dignity of individual human beings-was the very core of Jerome
71
Frank's religion...The question of whether legal values (or any values) are relative or
absolute was not really the basic question for Frank. The heart of the
matter was the process by which we reassessed, clarified, and expanded these values, and kept open the avenues for discovering new
values. What Frank vehemently decried was not the belief in values,
but the belief in superstition and dogma and the almost fanatical
attempts by some people to superimpose their values on others.
By any standard or definition of jurisprudence, Jerome Frank's role
as a supreme provocateur on the American legal scene has been of immeasurable value to the growth of our ideas on the function of law
in society. While his was not a systematic or definitive philosophy of
law, it had the virtue of being broad in its scope and its inherent
iconoclasm. Professor Edmond N. Cahn summed it up in this way:
I believe that Jerome Frank's fact-skepticism represents an epoch-making
contribution not only to legal theory and procedural reform, but also to
the understanding of the entire human condition. The history of our
time will record whether we profited by the challenges he bequeathed
to US.

72

This was indeed a fitting tribute to a truly creative legal mind,
a mind that was constantly aware of the ambiguities of man's existential situation while at the same time passionately reaffirming its
71. Cahn, Jerome Frank's Fact-Skepticism And Our Future, 66 YALE L.J.
824, 832 (1957). Dean Eugene V. Rostow of the Yale Law School said: "He
was an optimist and an enthusiast. Knowing sin, he believed in virtue. He
found the good in all men, and cheered it with conviction. No one of us will
ever forget the sincerity of his faith that we all possessed at least a peppercorn
of man's transitory potential for the divine." Rostow, Jerome N. Frank, 66
YALE L.J. 819 (1957).
72. Cahn, supra note 71 at 824. For a recent and more definitive treatment
of Frank's work, see Cahn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamental Law, 33
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1958); also, the superb memorial issue, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
625-803 (1957); and McWhinney, Book Review, Not Guilty, 33 IND. L.J. 111
(1957).
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faith in the power of human reason. Jerome Frank deserves a well-

earned place in the history of the liberal tradition.7 3

73. For a more exhaustive examination of Frank's philosophy of law, see
PAUL, THE LEGAL THINKING OF JEROME FRANK:

AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
University Library 1954).

A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY

(unpublished doctoral dissertation in the Ohio State

